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INTRODUCTION

The 1986 Tax Reform Act (1986 Act) caused many United States
investors to collapse or endure huge losses.1 Prior to the 1986 Act,
investors based financial decisions on the favorable tax treatment given
to investment property, particularly capital gains 2 and passive activities.3 The shift away from beneficial treatment of capital gains and
passive activities, 4 while not the sole cause, certainly contributed to
the Savings and Loan debacle, 5 the slow but steady decline of the

1. Lawrence Zelenak, When Good PreferencesGo Bad: A CriticalAnalysis of the Anti-Tax
Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEx. L. REV. 499 (1989).
2. I.R.C. § 1202 (repealed 1986).
3. I.R.C. § 469 (1991). This section, as amended by the 1986 Act, severely limits the ability
of taxpayers to utilize various tax-shelters which existed prior to the 1986 Act.
4. I.R.C. § 1202 (repealed 1986); I.R.C. § 469 (1991). Section 1202 had allowed deductions
for capital gains. Section 469, as amended by the 1986 Act, disallowed passive activity losses.
5. Numerous savings & loan's built their portfolios around real estate. The 1986 Act removed
most of the tax benefits which came with owning real estate. Therefore, real estate, which had
been appraised prior to the 1986 Act, dropped dramatically in price. The result was a portfolio
of investments which had decreased significantly in value. Lawrence J. White, FinancialInstitutions and Regulations, The S & L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration- The S & L Debacle,
59 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1991).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

1

Florida Journal
of International Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 6
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. 6

economy 6 and the continuation of Japanese investment in the United
7
States.
The Japanese, on the other hand, have continued their favorable
treatment of capital gains in their Tax Code.8 Whereas Japanese investors do fall under the United States Tax Code on income arising from
activities in the United States, 9 they continue to receive favorable
treatment on investments in Japan. 10 This favorable treatment insures
the availability of investment capital. It would appear United States
investors, like their Japanese counterparts, also could acquire capital
on ventures in Japan. This is not the case, however, because of the
barriers to foreign investment in Japan. 1 These barriers, combined
with the favorable treatment of capital gains in Japan, create an imbalance between Japanese investment in the United States and United
States investment in Japan.
The United States must decide what general policy to follow when
correcting this imbalance. It may cultivate protectionism or open markets and free trade. 2 This comment addresses why the United States
should reestablish favorable treatment for investment property in the
United States, specifically capital gains, and maintain a policy of open
markets and free trade rather than establish barriers to foreign investment.
II.
A.

HISTORY

Capital Gains in the United States and Japan

Historically, both the Japanese and United States Tax Codes favored creating investment capital, specifically, by preferential treatment of capital gains. 3 Japan sought to stimulate an economy depleted

6. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 507.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 855, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 12, 1990). Foreign investment in
the United States increased from $55 billion at the end of 1979 to $401 billion at the end of
1989. Id.
8.

COOPERS & LYBRAND, 1992 INTERNATIONAL TAX SUMMARIES J-12,

J-15, J-16, J-20.

9. John S. Nolan, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment in the United States, 8
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 291, 293 (1990).
10.

COOPERS & LYBRAND,

supra note

8.

11. Toshinobu Inada, Investment Opportunitiesand Barriersin Japan: The Regulation of
Direct Investment, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 463, 465 (1991).
12. The choice between protectionism and open markets is only a choice with regard to a
general policy. When specific details of any particular treaty are negotiated, leeway should be
allowed based on the needs of the participating nations.
13. See Lee A. Sheppard, What We Can Learn From the Japanese,35 TAx NOTES (TAX
ANALYSTS) 224 (1987).
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of investment capital after World War I1.14 The United States has
provided numerous justifications for the favorable treatment of capital
gains, including the argument that a portion of the gains are the result
of inflation and, therefore, full taxation would be unfair. 15 In addition
to favorable treatment of capital gains, both countries have enacted
provisions for preferential tax treatment of income that is reinvested
16
within a prescribed period.
The major difference between the two countries' tax codes has
been the stability of the Japanese Tax Code,, versus the constant
change of the United States Tax Code.18 For example, the depreciation
systems and corporate tax rates in Japan have been relatively stable
for years. 19 Also, capital gains on securities in Japan remained almost
completely tax exempt prior to 1988. 2o This stability caused Japanese
investors, confident there would not be unanticipated tax burdens, to
realize enormous profits on investments. 21 The result has been an
22
economy with a staggering growth rate over the past forty years.
In contrast, the United States investor has had to anticipate the constant changes in the United States Tax Code, including the 1986 Act,3
which eliminated almost all preferential treatment of capital gains.2
This lack of stability has adversely affected the United States econ24

omy.

B.

International Tax Policies

The United States has led the industrialized world by supporting
policies that create open markets and encourage free trade.- These

14.

See id. The Japanese code was actually designed by Americans after World War II. Id.

15.

JAMES J.

(1987).
16.

FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 647

I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1034; COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 8, at J-16.

17. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 224-25.
18. Id. at 225; FREELAND ET AL., supra note 15, at 648-49; Revenue Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-216, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 680, 714; Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 150(a),

56 Stat. 798, 843; Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1402, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1731-33;
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1011-12; I.R.C. § 1202.
19. Sheppard, supra note 13.
20.

Yuji GOMI, GUIDE TO JAPANESE TAXES 1989-90.

See id. $1-200.
Alan S. Gutterman, Japan and Korea: Contrasts and Comparisons in Regulatory
Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8 INT'L TAX & BUS. L. 267 (1991).
23. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 74 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
7 (May 8, 1987) [hereinafter General Explanation of TRA 1986].
21.
.22.

24.

Zelank, supra note 1, at 507; White, supra note 5.

25.

Nolan, supra note 9, at 295.
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policies have been implemented primarily through tax treaties that
favor neither the domestic nor foreign investor.26 The United States
encouraged these policies when it was the world's economic leader
and believed the source country should only tax foreign investors on
income earned in the source country. 2 These policies focused on avoiding discrimination and double taxation. 28 Although some measures have
acted to discriminate in favor of United States investors, the basic
policies have remained intact. 9
The Japanese adopted a much different approach. Relying on a
rationale similar to the one behind preferential treatment for capital
gains, the Japanese passed protectionist measures immediately after
World War II to help rebuild their economy. 3° These measures, coupled31
with informal barriers, have dissuaded foreign investment in Japan.
Japanese investors took advantage of this protection, and turned their
country into an economic power with an economic growth rate that
was approximately twice that of the United States during the 1980's.H
III.
A.

PRESENT INVESTMENT POLICIES

Favorable Treatment for Investors in Japan

In 1988, the Japanese Tax Code underwent a series of revisions
(1988 revisions) because, like the United States Tax Code prior to
1986, 3 many people considered the provisions which so heavily favored
investment unfair." Unlike the 1986 Act, the 1988 revisions still pro-

26.
27.

Id. at 293, 294.
See id.at 293.
28. Id. at 294; STAFF
SESS., BACKGROUND AND

OF JOINT COMMITTEE

ON TAXATION,

101ST CONG.,

2D

ISSUES RELATING TO THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME IN

66 (Comm. Print, 1990).
See S. REP. No.445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); John Turro, U.S. Treaty Overrides
Criticized by IFA Members, 45 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 22 (1989); John A. Corry &
William L. Burke, Legislative Overrides of Tax Treaties, 37 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 931
(1987); Mike McIntyre, More in Defense of Treaty Overrides, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L (TAX
ANALYSTS) 35 (1990).
30. Inada, supra note 11, at 464.
31. Id. at 465-72.
32. Robert Ortner, All the Wrong Moves on the Defiit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1990, § 3,
at 13, col. 1. The Japanese spent 1/4 of their national income on capital investments and research
and development during this period. Id. The United States only spent 1/8 of its national income
on these investments. Id.
THE UNITED STATES

29.

33. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 23.
34. WORLD TAX REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT 1, 4-5 (Joseph Pachman ed. 1988).
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vided preferential treatment for capital gains. For example, capital
gains on securities, for the most part untaxed prior to the 1988 revisions,3 are now taxed at a 20% rate.37 When compared with top income
brackets of 50%,3 this 20% rate is very favorable treatment. 39 Additionally, there are non-recognition provisions which allow the Japanese
investor to roll-over any gains on the sale of land or buildings used
for business purposes if the proceeds are used to acquire new land or
buildings for investment. 40 These provisions, coupled with beneficial
treatment of capital gains, insure a favorable environment for capital
investment.
B.

No Favorable Treatment for Investors in the United States

The United States, on the other hand, has almost completely abandoned any preferential treatment of capital gains.41 Whereas the
United States Tax Code does contain some non-recognition provisions

for residential property and like-kind exchanges,42 capital gains are
taxed at the same rate as ordinary income43 or for top bracket taxpayers at a rate 3% less.- This 3% differential is far less than the

35.

COOPERS & LYBRAND,

36.

GOMI, supra note 20.

supra note 8.

37. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 8, at J-15. This tax rate is at the taxpayers option.
He may elect a different taxation method; however, the 20% rate is generally the most beneficial.
Id.
38. Id. at J-14. The current brackets and rates are:

TABLE
0-3,000,000
3,000,000-6,000,000 yen
6,000,000-10,000,000 yen
10,000,000-20,000,000 yen
over 20,000,000 yen

(approximately $21,000) - 10%
($21,000-43,000) - 20%
($43,000-71,000) - 30%
($71,000-143,000) - 40%
($143,000) - 50%

In addition to these national taxes there is a local tax which is:
0-1,600,000 yen
1,600,000-5;500,000 yen
over 6,600,000 yen

($11,000) - 5%
($11,000-39,000) - 10%
($39,000) - 15%

39. See id. at J-15, J-16 (providing an explanation of other favorable treatment given to
capital gains).
40. GoMI, supra note 20.
41. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 23, at 179.
42. I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1034 (1991).
43. General Explanation of TRA 1986, supra note 23, at 179.
44. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11,101(c), 104 Stat.
1388. A rate of 28% was established as the maximum for capital gains. Id. This 28% rate is 3%
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30% differential for top-bracket taxpayers in Japan. 45 Similarly, the
like-kind provisions in the United States Tax Code are far more limited
than the non-recognition provisions in the Japanese Tax Code.46
Trend Toward Investment Barriers in the United States

C.

In what appears to be a steady departure from past policies, the47
United States is beginning to take steps to inhibit foreign investment.
In 1989, the United States adopted earnings stripping provisions which
adversely affect foreign investment." It also appears President Clinton
favors placing a heavier tax burden on foreign investment in the United
States. 49 There have been strong objections from foreign countries to
any provisions which override present tax treaties.w° Attitudes against
foreign products and investment, including Japan-bashing, are also
becoming more prevalent. 5'
IV.
A.

A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE

Aiding the United States Investor

Public sentiment appears to demand action directly against Japan. 52
This action could be accomplished by creating barriers against
Japanese imports and investments.5 This action would actually worsen
the United States economy in the long run,5" elicit retaliatory meas-

lower than the top rate for ordinary income of 31% which is the rate for the majority of txnayers
who own capital assets. See David E. Rosenbaum, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1990, at Al.
45. The top rate of 50% less the rate on capital gains of 20% equals a 30% reduction of the"
tax burden on taxpayers in the top bracket. The taxpayers in this bracket own the majority of
capital assets; therefore, this is the relevant comparison. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note
8. Top bracket taxpayers in the United States had the same 30% differential prior to the 1986
Act. Rosenbaum, supra note 44.
46. I.R.C. § 1031; COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 8. The Japanese provision is broader
because it does not require the reinvestment to be in like-kind property. Id.
47. Turro, supra note 29; see Corry & Burke, supra note 29; ROBERT E. BALDWIN, EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF COMMERCIAL POLICY

245 (1991).

48. H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1240 (1989).
49. David S. Broder, Bush Assails Clinton n Trade Policy, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 28,
1992, at Al.
50. See Turro, supra note 29.
51. Don Oberdorfer, U.S.-Japan Relations Seen Suffering Worst Downturn in Decades,
THE WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1992, at Al.
52. Id.

53.

See

RICHARD NIXON, SEIZE THE DAY

265-66 (1992) (explaining how the barriers in

the United States to sugar and peanut imports have aided the United States producers while
adversely affecting foreign producers).
54. BALDWIN, supra note 47, at 273; Nolan, supra note 9, at 298. The effect of the 1989
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ures5 and violate existing treaties.- Instead, the United States should
initiate measures favoring domestic investors. One such measure would
57
be a return to preferential treatment of capital gains. While it is

true this policy would favor all investment in the United States,s the
policy is nevertheless justified because the rationale is to stimulate
growth in the United States and allow for the creation of investment
capital for United States investors.
Tax breaks for capital gains will increase tax revenue by creating
more taxable transactions, stimulate the economy by increasing investment, 59 and allow domestic investors the opportunity to create capital
for investments at home and abroad.- The present 3% differential
provided for taxpayers in the 31% bracket, while having some affect,
does not provide enough incentive for investment. The United States,
similar to Japan, 61 should adopt a tax policy forcing taxpayers in the
top bracket to invest their money or lose it to taxation.
A new tax bracket at approximately 40% for income greater than
$100,000 would conduce investment and help revitalize the economy.
The $100,000 income level is an appropriate dividing line because over
80% of all capital assets are owned by persons who make over
$100,000.6 The 40% tax bracket would initiate immediate investment

by these taxpayers. Additionally, the higher tax bracket, while keeping
the capital gains rate at 28%, would blunt the criticism that preferential
treatment of capital gains hurts taxpayers with lower incomes.

earnings-stripping provision, one protectionist measure recently passed, will be to force some
United States taxpayers to go to less desirable lending sources at higher rates. The result being
less United States tax revenue. Leonard B. Terr, Policy Perspective, 1 TAx NOTES INT'L (TAX
ANALYSTS)

156 (1989).

55. See Terr, supra note 54, at 158 (noting many other countries are presently considering
anti-earnings stripping legislation in response to the United States earnings stripping provisions).
56. Turro, supra note 29.
57. Congress recognized the possible need for a return to preferential treatment of capital
gains as the code sections which dealt with capital gains were left in the United States Tax
Code. See I.R.C. §§ 1221-1223 (1991).

58. Nolan, supra note 9.
59. See Rosenbaum, supra note 44 (reporting Senator Mitchell, a devout opponent of capital
gains cuts, acknowledges they can be used to stimulate business investment); David Slawson,
Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623, 639

(1967).
60. Id. When Congress created the 1986 Act, they appeared to be juxtaposing the benefits
of capital gains against some theoretical idea of what a fair income tax code would look like.
At the present time it would seem the main consideration should be stimulating the economy.
61. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 8.
62. Rosenbaum, supra note 44.
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The major complaint against preferential treatment for capital gains
has always been that only the rich have capital assets. 63 This complaint
was part of the reason for the recent tax reforms in both the United
States and Japan. If the rate on capital gains is kept at 28% while
the top rate is raised, it is difficult to substantiate this complaint
because this change would not adversely affect taxpayers in the lower
brackets. This new top rate, without a corresponding reduction in the
rate on capital gains, however, would probably be difficult for those
affected taxpayers to swallow.
One way to make it more acceptable would be to follow the Japanese
example of no tax on reinvested income.6 The Japanese have a zero
tax rate on investment income from the sale of buildings or land which
is reinvested, 65 similar to United States treatment of like-kind property.6+ The United States should adopt a similar zero rate for reinvested income, including all capital gains. Any capital gains that are
reinvested would go untaxed with a corresponding reduction in the
6
basis of the purchased asset7.
Upon the taxpayer's death, the estate
would be required to pay all of the foregone taxes.68
For example, if the taxpayer had a gain of $50,000 on the sale of
a capital asset and reinvested $40,000, the tax rate would be 28% on
$10,000 and the basis of the purchased property would be reduced by
$40,000. The taxes would have to be paid on any inter vivos transfer,
including a gift, which did not have a corresponding reinvestment.
The taxpayer could not defer taxation indefinitely because, upon his
death, all applicable taxes become payable.
ASo, it is imAportant for any me t
I^
1
to ha
1"Vat, 11om
built-in stability measures. The Japanese Tax Code, while undergoing
some changes, has remained consistent in its favorable treatment of
capital gains.69 Such certainty instills consumer confidence and assures
investors they will not face unexpected tax consequences. A provision
which protects investments made prior to any changes in the Tax
Code 7° or one which guarantees favorable treatment of capital gains

63.

Id.

COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 8.
65. Id.
66. I.R.C. § 1031.
67. The reduction in the basis ofthe reinvested income will insure the income is eventually
taxed. The gain will be proportionally greater on any later transaction and taxed at that time
unless reinvested.
68. These taxes are presently collected through estate and gift taxes.
69. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 8; Sheppard, supra note 13, at 225.
70. A "grandfather clause" would prevent the major complaint which followed the passage
64.
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with a rolling continuation clause would provide stability.71 Either
provision would appear to limit the government's ability to encourage
specific capital investment through manipulation of the Tax Code.r7
The government could still encourage specific capital investment, however, through minor decreases of the 28% rate on whatever capital
investment the government wishes to encourage.The changes in the United States Tax Code would allow United
States investors to create capital and thus compete more effectively
at home and abroad. The alternative, the creation of investment barriers, could have devastating effects.
B.

Avoiding Investment Barriers

The Great Depression started as a recession but was escalated, in
part, by the passage of the Tariff Act of 1930. 74 A similar reaction to
the present recession would be a mistake for several reasons. First,
treaty overrides would violate the United States' present commitments. 75 Second, and more importantly, trade barriers would stifle
the global economy 76 as the 1986 Act stifled the United States economy.
United States investors counted on the favorable treatment their
investments received under the pre-1986 Tax Code in much the same
way global investors count on international treaties when making in-

of the 1986 Act. Many investors complained the 1986 Act made good investments go sour. As
previously discussed, this was exactly what happened. See Robert B. Robbins, Distress Situations: Limited PartnerDefaults, Resales, Restructurings,Bankruptcy, Recission Offers, Dissolution, C604 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 405, 409 (1991).
71. The continuation clause would require the government to give a two year warning
before making any tax rate changes. Such a provision would enable investors to prepare for
changes in the Tax Code. In the past investors have tried to predict what changes would occur.
Wholesale changes, as occurred in 1986, often catch investors unprepared and lead to catastrophes
for individual investors and the economy. See Robbins, supra note 69; Patricia A. Brown, The
Resounding Thunder of Rifle Shots: Tax Laws for Individuals, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 779,
790-94.
72. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond PublicChoice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation of the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1990).
73. See id.
74. See Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the International
Court of Justice, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 391, 397 (1991) (explaining in 1934 the United States
recognized the need to remove trade barriers to get out of the Depression).
75. Corry & Burke, supra note 29.
76. James E. Gjerset, Crippling United States Airlines: Archaic Interpretations of the
Federal Aviation Act's Restriction on Foreign Capital Investment, 7 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 173 (1991).
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vestments. 7 When the 1986 Act was passed, investors who enjoyed
profitable investments because of tax advantages now suffered unprofitable investments. Additionally, consumer confidence was destroyed,
making it almost impossible to create new capital to salvage these
investments. The result was stifled investment and a stagnated economy.
Creating investment barriers, instead of treaties favoring investment, would have the same damaging effect on a global scale.7M Barriers
in the United States would lead to retaliatory measures from other
countries and an eventual stagnation of global transactions. Whereas
stagnation of the global economy would hurt the United States, it
would devastate the developing democracies in Europe. 79 Similarly,
the Japanese economy would suffer if the United States began shutting
its doors.- Such measures are a step away from capitalist principles
of open competition and a step toward socialist principles of government subsidization and higher taxes. Recent events have demonstrated
socialist economic principles simply do not work. 81 Therefore, any step
in that direction would be a step in the wrong direction.
The United States should continue treaty negotiations with Japan
in an effort to open Japanese markets.82 Feeling the effects of the
United States recession,ss the Japanese are becoming aware of the
importance of fair trade policies and are making their markets more
accessible to foreign investors.8 At this time, it is imperative for the
United States to work with Japan and other nations by continuing a
policy of open markets and free trade.85

77.
are but
78.
79.
80.

Earnest R. Larkins, Multinationalsand Their Quest for the Good Tax Havens: Taxes
One, Albeit an Important, Consideration, 25 INT'L LAW 471, 475 (1991).
See Murphy, supra note 74.
Id.
Id.; see Helen Dewer, Democrats Propose Curb on JapaneseCar Imports, THE WASH.
POST, Dec. 21, 1991, at C1.
81. Clayton Jones, Failures of "Wartime" Socialist Economy Prompt a Re-Thinking in
Vietnam, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 20, 1987, at 10, col. 4.
82.

See JOINT REPORT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL IM-

PEDIMENTS

INITIATIVE (1990). This is one of many recent treaties dealing with international

trade.

83. Paul Blustein, Japan'sFast-PacedEconomy Adjusts to Life in Slow Lane, THE WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 1991, at C1. During the first nine months of 1991 the number of corporate
bankruptcies in Japan rose 64%. Id.
84. Jonathan Fuerbringer, World Markets No Longer a Sure Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1990, § 3, at 16, col. 3; Margaret Shapiro, Japan, U.S. Agree to Make Basic Changes, THE
WASH. POST, June 29, 1990, at Al.
85. Gary R. Saxonhouse, Japan, SII and the International Harmonization of Domestic
Economic Practices, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450 (1991).
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Open markets encourage competition.- Protectionism, or a lack of
competition, leads to government subsidization8 7 which, invariably,
leads to higher prices and more taxes.8 When prices and taxes rise
there is less consumer spending power;8 therefore, to employ the
same work force requires more government subsidization, or in the
alternative, unemployment. This cycle feeds upon itself and eventually,
as recent history has demonstrated, will devour itself. Competition,
the foundation of capitalism, may not give the exact results desired,
but the alternative, socialism, is a proven failure.V.

CONCLUSION

With increasing public sensitivity to Japanese investment in the
United States, it is important for the United States to continue policies
which historically have worked rather than those which historically
have failed. Favorable treatment of capital gains and protection of
investment income turned Japan's devastated post-war economy into
a world economic power in a relatively short time.91 Reestablishing
favorable treatment for investment income in the United States would
free up investment capital and allow United States investors to revitalize our economy. This tax policy, coupled with provisions which
insure some stability in the Tax Code, will help avoid the catastrophes
which followed the 1986 Act.
At the same time, it is important to avoid artificial barriers having
detrimental effects on both the United States economy and the global
economy. Instead, the United States should continue policies of free
trade and open markets while negotiating with the Japanese to open
their markets. These policies are basic to a capitalist system and, with
the recent worldwide failure of socialist economic principles, ones that
the United States must not abandon.
Robert F. Rogers

86.
87.

BALDWIN, supra note 47, at 169, 202.
Id. at 11.'

88.

Id. at 75, 201-12.

89.

See id. at 202.

90. Jones, supra note 81.
91. Gutterman, supra note 22.
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